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There are two views, or types of views concerning fundamental ontology 
that are of particular interest in the current discussion of the Mind-Body problem, 
which I will call “Physicalism” and “Emergent Property Dualism.” According to 
Physicalism, the world’s fundamental ontology is physical and the best account of 
that ontology is provided by fundamental physics. According to contemporary 
physics, this ontology consists of particles, strings and fields of various types that 
occupy space-time (or bear spatio-temporal relations to one another) and possess 
a limited number of quantitative properties (mass, charge, electromagnetic 
potential and so on). Physics also claims that there are only a few fundamental 
dynamical and perhaps non-dynamical laws that govern the structure of space-
time and evolution of its occupants. Physicalism asserts that everything else, 
whatever other entities and properties there are, is composed out of and realized 
by configurations of this fundamental physical ontology. Physicalism also asserts 
that all macroscopic or special science laws, causal relations, probabilities are 
ultimately derived from the laws of fundamental physics and the arrangement of 
fundamental physical entities.1  
 According to “Emergent Property Dualism”, the fundamental ontology 
includes, in addition to the ontology of physics, fundamental mental or proto 
mental properties and may also include fundamental laws that link mental 
 
1 Lewis 1983, Jackson 1993, Papineau 1993, Loewer 2001, Melnyk 2003, e.g., are 
physicalists of this sort. The first precise formulation of physicalism comes from 
Lewis 1983. Subsequent discussions are variations of the same theme. Many 
philosophers, among them non-physicalists, accept Lewis’s definition as 
capturing the intuitive notion of physicalism (see, e.g., Chalmers 1996 p 41-42). 
The term “physicalism” is sometimes used to label another, weaker doctrine, i.e., 
the view that all entities are physical or physically realized. Davidson 1980 seems 
to have such a view. 
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properties to each other and to certain properties of physical systems.2 By “mental 
properties” I mean properties that involve phenomenal consciousness and/or 
intentionality. A phenomenal property is such that, in Nagel’s famous phrase, 
there is something it is like to have it; for example, feeling dizzy. An intentional 
property is one which involves some kind of aboutness or reference; for example, 
thinking about Vienna.3  Emergent property dualists differ from older dualist 
traditions in that their ontologies don’t include mental entities or substances, only 
mental properties that are instantiated in certain physical systems (e.g., you and 
me). 
There are two varieties of Emergent Property Dualism; interactive and 
epiphenomenal. Interactive property dualists posit sui generis mental laws and 
causal relations that are thought to be required to account for mental processes 
and for certain physical phenomena; for example, to account for intelligent 
behavior. Epiphenomenal property dualists agree with physicalists that physical 
phenomena can be explained entirely within physics but hold that fundamental 
mental properties are needed to account for the very existence of mental 
phenomena since these cannot be explained physically. Interactive Property 
Dualism holds that there are horizontal (as well as vertical) laws connecting 
mental to physical properties. Epiphenomenal dualists think that there are only 
 
2 I will assume that these laws are contingent; i.e., not metaphysically necessary. 
If laws are taken to be metaphysically necessary then it is difficult to state the 
difference between Physicalism and Emergent Dualism since then both would 
hold that configurations of physical property instantiations metaphysically 
necessitate mental property instantiations. The physicalist adds that the mental 
properties are nothing over and above the physical properties while the dualist 
says that they are distinct, but it is difficult to say what this comes to. Almog 2002 
holds a view on which mind and body are distinct but there is a necessary 
connection between them but I find the view implausible and even hard to 
consistently articulate. 
3 The natures of and relationship between phenomenal consciousness and 
intentionality are vast and much discussed topics. In this paper I am not assuming 
any specific view about how they are connected and whether it is possible for one 
to be instantiated without the other.   
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vertical laws connecting mental properties to either mental or physical 
properties.4  
If I am permitted to use a theological metaphor I could say that on the 
physicalist view to create the world all God needed to do was to create a 
fundamental physical ontology and fundamental laws, and distribute elements of 
the ontology as an initial condition – the Big Bang – in space-time and then let the 
universe evolve in accordance with those laws. On the emergent property dualist 
view, God didn’t rest until s/he also created mental properties and laws 
connecting them to each other and to certain (perhaps very complicated) physical 
properties of physical systems. 5  
  
The Emergence of Consciousness 
 
 
4 Emergent Property Dualism was advocated by the “British Emergentists” 
including C.D. Broad 1951. Recently the view has gotten more popular among 
philosophers; Chalmers’ 1996 book The Conscious Mind is a major influence in 
the resurgence of Dualism. Chalmers on his weblog fragments of consciousness 
on September 26, 2005 
(http://fragments.consc.net/djc/2005/09/jaegwon_kim_com.html) cites the 
following (recent or long term) converts to Dualism: Joseph Almog, Torin Alter, 
George Bealer, Laurence BonJour, Paul Boghossian, Tyler Burge, Tim Crane, 
John Foster, Brie Gertler, George Graham, W.D. Hart, Ted Honderich, Terry 
Horgan, Steven Horst, Saul Kripke, Harold Langsam, E.J. Lowe, Kirk Ludwig, 
Trenton Merricks, Martine Nida-Rumelin, Adam Pautz, David Pitt, Alvin 
Plantinga, Howard Robinson, William Robinson, Gregg Rosenberg, A.D. Smith, 
and Richard Swinburne, Stephen White. The majority of philosophers working on 
the Mind-Body problem are still (?) physicalists. 
5 An ontological view distinct from the two I am discussing and which deserves 
more than this footnote is what David Chalmers calls “Type F Monism” 
(sometimes it is also referred to as “Russellian Monism”). According to type F 
Monism, the most fundamental properties are both mental and physical in that 
they possess a physical dispositional nature and a mental categorical nature. So 
the view is neither physicalist nor emergentist. As I see it the main problem with 
this view is that it is not easy to see what the categorical mental features of 
fundamental physical properties (e.g., being an electromagnetic field value) can 
possibly be or how the configuration of such proto mental properties can result in 
genuine mental properties (i.e., a sensation of red).   
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According to contemporary cosmology, the early universe – a few minutes 
after the Big Bang – was a very dense, very hot soup of elementary particles and 
radiation. As the universe expanded, this soup evolved in accordance with the 
laws producing novel arrangements and modifications of the fundamental 
physical ontology. Thus appeared stars, planets, oceans, single cell plants and 
animals, and so on. For each of these kinds there was a time at which there were 
no things of that kind and a later time in which there were things of that kind and, 
for some kinds, a period of time when it was not determinate whether or not that 
kind was instantiated.  
Even if we don’t know all the details, it is still very plausible (in this most 
physicalists and dualists are in agreement) that the physical ontology and the 
physical laws are sufficient in principle to account for stars, planets, oceans, 
plants, up until at least single cell animals.6 That is, it looks plausible that each of 
these kinds and their properties are constituted by and realized in the arrangement 
of entirely physical ontology. To create all these kinds all God had to do is to 
create the initial physical conditions and the laws. 
 At some point in time the first glimmerings of consciousness occurred. 
Consciousness might have appeared first in fishes, or mammals, or Homo sapiens. 
Or perhaps, as David Chalmers suggests, proto-conscious states are associated 
even with very simple physical systems. If this is so then at some point these 
proto-conscious states combined to constitute a genuinely conscious state.7 But 
 
6 An alternative view is Pluralism, according to which various special sciences 
deal with entities and properties that are distinct from each other and from 
physical ones. Chemistry, biology, psychology each would quantify over distinct 
properties that are connected to physical properties (and to each other) by 
contingent law. Since, in my opinion, this is not a very plausible view I am not 
going to discuss it further here. 
7 Chalmers 1996, pp. 297-99. If this is right, God had to create more than the 
physical ontology just to create ordinary physical things. This view, which is a 
version of Epiphenomenal Dualism, is not in itself the same as Type F Monism. 
The proto-conscious states, according to this view, are connected to physical 
states via contingent law; rather than being the categorical bases of the 
dispositional physical states, as in Type F Monism. On the Type F Monist view, 
the creation of physical and consciousness properties are of a piece, since proto-
consciousness is supposed to provide the categorical bases for dispositional 
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whenever it was that consciousness first emerged,8 Physicalism and Dualism have 
very different accounts of that emergence. According to Physicalism, 
consciousness, like other biological phenomena, is constituted by or realized in 
certain processes involving arrangements of fundamental physical entities. In 
contrasts, dualists claim that consciousness is a phenomenon that is entirely 
distinct from physical phenomena. According to emergent dualists, matter, fields, 
etc., no matter how complicated, are not metaphysically sufficient for 
consciousness. Its emergence requires the existence of vertical laws that link it to 
physical properties. At some point in the history of the universe such physical 
properties were first instantiated and via those laws consciousness emerged. 
 Most physicalists (and some epiphenomenalist dualists as well) think that 
the fundamental physical laws specify for every physical state how it will evolve 
or the chances of various possible evolutions. If the fundamental physical laws are 
of the latter sort – as some versions of Quantum Mechanics say – then the state of 
the universe at any time and the laws don’t completely determine what will 
emerge and so there is a strong sense in which a new configuration of physical 
elements may be novel. (But even if the dynamical laws are deterministic, as 
other versions of Quantum Mechanics have it, the evolution of physical ontology 
has continually produced and continues to produce “new” physical phenomena.) 
In any case, on both the dualist and physicalist version of this view, the evolution 
of physical phenomena is explained by a purely physical ontology. Dualists who 
hold this view think that mental properties are epiphenomenal with respect to 
physical properties. On this view, the fact that I have a pounding head-ache is not 
causally relevant to my behavior and in particular to my subsequently taking an 
aspirin. This is rather implausible but it is forced on a dualist who holds the causal 
 
physical properties. The two views agree in that the proto-mental properties and 
laws had been instantiated since the Big Bang; and that the emergence of bona 
fide consciousness requires special, complex arrangements of the proto-mental 
properties. 
8 Of course, according to some Theist Dualists, consciousness and the rest of the 
universe were created all at once, and therefore they would reject the evolutionary 
framework in which I discuss these issues. This, however, will leave the basic 
metaphysical issues unchanged. 
 6 
closure of physics and thinks that pervasive overdetermination of behavior by 
both mental and physical causes is implausible.9 
 Interactionist dualists, on the other hand, claim that the physical is not 
causally closed and that, in addition to the vertical mental-physical laws that bind 
mental and physical phenomena together, there are also horizontal mental-
physical laws that fill in gaps or supersede physical laws and so they take it that 
with the emergence of consciousness there evolve novel physical, as well as 
mental arrangements that cannot be accounted for purely physically. Another way 
of putting the difference between the two version of Dualism is that if the first 
version (Non-Interactive, or Epiphenomenal Dualism) is correct then if God had 
created the purely physical ontology and neglected to add the mental phenomena 
and mental laws then the world might have evolved in a way that matched the 
physicalist account as far as the arrangements of physical ontology is concerned 
but its living beings would have been what the philosophy of consciousness 
literature calls “zombies”.10 On the Interactive Dualists view, on the other hand, 
depending on how the horizontal laws operate, by omitting the mental phenomena 
and mental laws, God might have created a world that evolves in a way that is 
even physically different from ours. 
 
Arguments against Physicalism 
 
The contemporary mind-body problem is the problem of determining 
which of these fundamental ontologies – if either – is correct. It is surely true that 
most people’s intuitions favor the dualist’s ontology. We have no idea how purely 
physical phenomena – the whirling of atoms in the void or undulations of fields, 
or patterns of neuronal activity can result in mental phenomena, and more 
 
9 Jaegwon Kim 1988 has developed this point at length as a problem for any 
version of Property Dualism. 
10 For those only familiar with the zombies of B-movies: philosophical “zombies” 
are beings that are physically identical to human beings – they move like us, 
apparently speak and behave intelligently – but they completely lack phenomenal 
experience; in another bit of philosophical terminology, introduced by Nagel 
1974, “there is nothing it is like” to be one of them. 
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specifically in consciousness. Dualist philosophers have fashioned various 
arguments from these considerations and I will address one such argument, David 
Chalmers’ Conceivability Argument shortly in more detail. 
Before that I will briefly discuss another consideration that has sometimes 
been brought against Physicalism. Some dualists have argued for a dualist 
ontology by claiming that some physical phenomena cannot be adequately 
explained solely in terms of physical laws and events; in other words, they have 
appealed to phenomena that seem to indicate that physics cannot be causally 
complete. Descartes produced arguments of this type and more recently so has 
Carl Popper and John Eccles.  
According to Descartes, language use, mathematical computation, and 
more generally rational behavior could not be explained physically. The reason 
was that these behaviors exhibit a kind of “creativity” or “novelty” that he thought 
merely physical – which he conceived as mechanical – causes could not produce. 
The point is very familiar. There are meaningful sentences that we can produce 
and understand that have never been produced before and mathematical problems 
that are solved for the first time. Descartes thought that no mere “machine” could 
accomplish these feats. To a large extent this line of argument has been 
abandoned in the face of developments in the cognitive sciences that suggest 
models of how purely mechanical devices – computers and connectionist 
machines – can produce linguistic behavior and solve mathematical problems. 
However, it should be noted that there are no satisfactory accounts of how 
meaningfulness or intentionality can be physically realized, nor are there 
satisfactory accounts of the general all purpose reasoning that human beings 
engage in. But, of course, it isn’t as if positing nonphysical properties or entities 
in any way advanced the theoretical understanding of these phenomena.  
Another kind of role for mentality in producing physical effects has been 
suggested in the literature on interpreting quantum mechanics. It has been 
suggested – e.g., by Eugene Wigner, John Wheeler and David Chalmers11 – that 
conscious observation is required for the “collapse” of the quantum mechanical 
 
11 For an in-depth discussion see Loewer 2003. 
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state of a system and thus for the appearance of the usual macroscopic world. If 
this were so then the physical laws would be incomplete and mental laws and 
causes would be involved in the evolution of physical systems. It is said that John 
Wheeler actually attempted to “measure” the effects of observation on quantum 
systems. 
However, the connections between consciousness and quantum mechanics 
that Wigner et al. suggested have lost their appeal. Purely physical phenomena are 
sufficient to underlie the “collapse” of wave functions and there are various 
accounts of quantum mechanics now that make no reference to observation at all 
in formulating their laws.   
While arguments for interactive dualism deserve more than the few 
paragraphs above I think it is pretty much a consensus among philosophers that 
these arguments are not persuasive and so dualists in recent times have mostly 
appealed to a very different line of thought. This line of thought also can be found 
in Descartes. The heart of the argument is Descartes’ idea that since we can 
clearly and distinctly conceive of a body existing without mind (a zombie), and 
vice versa, it is possible for them to exist separately, and so bodily, i.e., physical 
phenomena are not metaphysically sufficient for consciousness.12 Recently 
sophisticated arguments along these lines have been proposed by Kripke 1972, 
Nagel 1974, Robinson 1993, Chalmers 1996, Jackson 1998, White 2005, and 
 
12 Descartes’ original argument was meant to show the distinction of mental and 
physical substances. Contemporary dualists are mostly property dualists. Another 
difference is that many contemporary dualists think that, whereas phenomenal 
properties are non-physical, intentional states (or those intentional states that 
don’t involve phenomenal concepts) are physical. The conceivability arguments 
intend to show only that phenomenal states are non-physical – they are silent 
about intentional states. Descartes himself thought that his conceivability 
argument proves that both intentional states (thoughts) and phenomenal states are 
non-physical. The connection between intentionality and consciousness and 
philosophers’ changing view about their relationship is a very interesting topic 
that I can’t go into. 
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Nida-Rümelin 2005.13 I will concentrate here on Chalmers, who formulates one 
of the most sophisticated versions of the argument.   
After considering the argument I will show that it is unsound.14 My 
diagnosis of the problem is that the Conceivability Arguments turn on a fact 
unappreciated by its proponents: the peculiarity of phenomenal concepts. 
Advocates of the argument fail to recognize the special role these concepts play in 
our cognitive architecture and they mistakenly explain the puzzles these special 
concepts create in terms of ontology. In other words, they posit distinct mental 
entities when positing distinct concepts would have sufficed. If this is right then 
there is good reason to think that the radical ontological novelty of consciousness 
is an illusion. I will argue for that view in the conclusion. 
 
 
Chalmers’ Conceivability Argument 
 
 Chalmers’ argument has three crucial and premises. The first concerns 
Physicalism. Physicalism requires that all true statements, including phenomenal 
statements like ‘Dave is experiencing a yellow sensation at t’, be necessitated by 
truths expressed in the language of physics.15 In this all physicalists agree. 
Chalmers argues furthermore that this necessitation must itself be a priori and that 
 
13 There is an altogether different argument proposed by Bealer 1997 that targets 
functionalism about mental states. Since many contemporary physicalists are 
functionalists this is an important argument for a physicalist to address; however, 
proper treatment of this very complex argument would require a separate paper. 
14 Other versions of the argument can be given a similar response. See Balog 1998 
for an application of this type of answer to each of the Conceivability Arguments.  
15 This roughly follows from the definition of physicalism stated at the beginning 
of the paper originating from Lewis 1983, with a slight complication. This 
definition is not strictly equivalent to physicalism. Statements that make reference 
to special kinds of property—to put it crudely, negative, and global properties—
are not necessitated by the full physical description of the world; they are only 
necessitated by the conjunction of the full physical description of the world 
together with the statement that it is the full fundamental description of the world. 
However, this issue will not make a difference for the rest of this paper so I will 
ignore it. 
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such a priori truths must be grounded in the nature of phenomenal and physical 
concepts. This is called the A Priori Entailment Thesis and is a powerful and quite 
controversial thesis. There are some interesting considerations in favor of it 
discussed in Chalmers 1996 (and in a number of subsequent papers by Chalmers) 
and Jackson 1993 and 1998, not the least of which is that the thesis links 
metaphysical modality and conceptual necessity in an intuitive and elegant way.  
 The second crucial premise derives from the observation that, even for an 
ideal knower who possesses mental concepts, it is possible to know all the 
physical facts concerning the distribution of particles and fields and the 
fundamental laws of physics, and yet fail to know the distribution of 
mental/consciousness properties, e.g., fail to know that Dave is experiencing a 
yellow sensation at t. Chalmers argues that an ideal knower, in possession of all 
the relevant concepts and a complete knowledge of the physical would be, at least 
in principle, in a position to figure out the distribution of stars, planets, oceans, 
cups of coffee, animals, and so on – but not where and when consciousness is 
instantiated. Hence the conceivability of zombies. The third premise of the 
argument simply is the claim that human beings are sometimes conscious (i.e., 
that eliminativism about consciousness is false). It follows from these three 
premises that consciousness is not physical, which also means that zombies are 
possible. In its own way, Chalmers’ argument, like Descartes’, also proceeds from 
the conceivability of zombies to their possibility.  
 
 Let’s state the argument more concisely. 
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(1) If Physicalism is true, then for any true T, statements of the form 
P->T 
are conceptual truths. 
(P is the complete fundamental physical description of the world 
including the fundamental physical laws and also a statement to the 
effect that it is complete). 
(2) There is some true statement Si to the effect that phenomenal 
conscious experience occurs (eliminativism about phenomenal 
experience is false). 
(3) If Si is a phenomenal statement, then 'P->Si' is not a conceptual 
truth.  
So 
(4) Physicalism is false. 
 
 
The Zombie Refutation 
 
 There are many responses to the Conceivability Argument; the one I will 
discuss here shows that the Conceivability Argument is self-undermining; with 
the addition of some very plausible premises one can derive a contradiction from 
it. My diagnosis is that that premise 1, the A Priori Entailment Thesis is false. I 
will argue that at least phenomenal statements (I want to remain non-committal 
with regard to non-phenomenal statements) are not a priori entailed by the 
complete physical truth about the world. This doesn’t mean that physicalism is 
true. Establishing that requires separate argument. However, if I am right, then the 
conceivability of zombies is compatible with their impossibility, and so a major 
argument for dualism is refuted.  
 Suppose that Chalmers’ argument is sound. It would be true then that 
physical facts do not necessitate phenomenal facts. And it would follow that there 
is a possible world that is exactly like our world physically, but in which no 
phenomenal, or other, nonphysical, facts obtain. Of course, I make this 
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assumption only for the sake of a reductio. If Physicalism is true, as I think it is, 
then such a world is impossible, or rather, merely conceptually possible. But my 
strategy is to show that the very assumption that there is such a world undermines 
the argument that leads to positing its existence in the first place. 
 In the world we are imagining there exists a zombie-Chalmers, physically 
just like Chalmers, but not the subject of any phenomenal states. This 
conceptually possible zombie will formulate an argument that parallels the 
Conceivability Argument word by word only to reach the conclusion that 
Physicalism is false in the zombie-world. What are we to make of this argument? 
First of all, plausibly, zombie-Chalmers has intentional states. When he talks, his 
words are not mere meaningless sounds. Moreover, I argue that it is plausible to 
assume that zombie-Chalmers’ intentional states are identical with Chalmers’ 
intentional states except for intentional states that, in Chalmers, involve 
phenomenal concepts. Those of zombie-Chalmers’ intentional states that, in 
Chalmers, involve phenomenal concepts refer to states of affairs present in 
zombie-Chalmers’ world (presumably his own brain states).16 On this view, 
zombie-Chalmers’ argument will be just as meaningful as Chalmers’, though not 
quite identical to it. Although the argument is word by word identical to 
Chalmers’ argument, some of the words (those that express phenomenal concepts 
in Chalmers’ language) have different meanings in Chalmers’ and zombie-
Chalmers’ mouths. I mark these words with a ‘+’. ‘Pain+’, for example, stands for 
a term of zombie-Chalmers that corresponds to Chalmers’ term ‘pain’. 
Zombie-Chalmers’ argument will go like this: 
 
 (1*) If Physicalism is true, then for any true T, statements of the form 
 
16 I argue for all this in much more detail in Balog 1999. 
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P->T 
are conceptual truths. 
(P is the complete fundamental physical description of the world 
including the fundamental physical laws and also a statement to the 
effect that it is complete). 
 
(2*) There is some true statement Si+ to the effect that phenomenal+ 
conscious experience occurs (eliminativism about phenomenal+ 
experience is false). 
(3*) If Si is a phenomenal+ statement, then 'P->Si+' is not a conceptual 
truth.  
So 
(4*) Physicalism is false. 
 
We know, however, that the dualist conclusion of zombie-Chalmers’ 
argument is, by hypothesis, false in the zombie-world. Consequently, we know 
that zombie-Chalmers’ argument cannot be sound. Since, given that it is 
meaningful, it is clearly valid, one of its premises has to be false. However, 
because arguably each premise of zombie-Chalmers’ argument is true if the 
corresponding premise in Chalmers’ argument is true, one of the premises of 
Chalmers’ argument must be false as well.17  
 The Zombie Refutation also helps diagnose where things went wrong. 
Since the other premises are extremely plausible, the fault must lie with premise 
1, the A Priori Entailment Thesis. This shows that the conceivability of zombies 
does not have to arise from a feature specific to phenomenal consciousness, but 
that, more plausibly, it arises from a certain peculiarity of our phenomenal 
concepts. Zombies are conceivable because our phenomenal concepts refer 
directly, (and not via a physical, functional, or behavioral mode of presentation). 
The physicalist who – like myself – accepts the conceivability of zombies – has to 
argue that this peculiarity, that is, referring to a property directly, is in principle 
 
17 See Balog 1999. 
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perfectly compatible with the hypothesis that they pick out a physical property.18 
If that is so, i.e., if phenomenal concepts refer directly to physical properties, then 
there is a perfect explanation of why the A Priori Entailment Thesis is 
inapplicable to statements involving these concepts. It is therefore imperative for 
physicalists to work out a – physicalist – theory of phenomenal concepts. Such a 
theory needs to provide a detailed and convincing account of how a purely 
physical concept can refer directly to a purely physical property. 
 
The constitutional account of phenomenal concepts 
 
There is an account that attempts to do exactly that. I can only sketch the main 
idea here.19 I start by stating some criteria that a good physicalist theory of 
phenomenal concepts must satisfy.  
Here are the minimal desiderata for a physicalist theory of phenomenal 
concepts: 
a) explain away the conceivability of zombies; that is, explain why the 
conceivability of zombies, far from being incompatible with Physicalism, is to 
be expected from the physicalist standpoint,  
b) account for apparent  incorrigibility – or rather infallibility – of certain 
judgments involving certain phenomenal concepts – e.g., my judging 
‘phenomenal red is occurring right now’,  
c) account for the way in which we seem to know our experiences – i.e., not by 
inference but by immediate acquaintance, 
d) account for the fact that our awareness of our own occurrent experience seems 
to give a substantial insight into its nature. 
 
 
18 Physicalists can be non-committal about whether phenomenal properties are 
complex physical properties or higher level, e.g., functional properties, realized 
by complex physical properties. In the rest of the paper when I talk about 
phenomenal concepts directly referring to “physical properties” I want the reader 
to understand “physical or functional properties”. 
19 Balog (forthcoming) elaborates the theory in much more detail. Similar ideas 
are proposed in Papineau 2002 and Block (forthcoming).  
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These desiderata suggest that a successful account of phenomenal 
concepts will have to posit a very intimate connection between conscious states 
and the concepts we form of them. Loar20 suggested the idea that phenomenal 
concepts are direct recognitional demonstrative concepts. I think he means by this 
that when a person is having a particular experience she can deploy a mental 
demonstrative to immediately demonstrate that experience and that in some way 
the mode of presentation associated with the demonstrative involves the 
experience. Loar’s suggestion is that the experience itself serves as a mode of 
presentation which, presumably, guides the demonstrative to the demonstrated 
experience. Loar doesn’t explain how this works or what exactly “mode of 
presentation” comes to here. My account here will try to fill in the details. 
The idea is that (certain) phenomenal concepts are partly constituted by 
the phenomenal experiences they refer to, and it is, at least in part, in virtue of 
being so constituted that they have the reference they have. On this view, a 
current phenomenal experience is literally part of the token concept currently 
applied to it, and the experience partly determines what the concept refers to. To 
be more precise, this is not a theory of phenomenal concepts in general. It is a 
theory of a subclass of phenomenal concepts, or certain characteristic applications 
of phenomenal concepts, if you will. What I have in mind is that there is a 
difference between phenomenal concepts that I apply to my own experience or 
imagination as it occurs and ones that I apply to your experiences, or to my past 
or future experiences. The first kind, like my concept ‘this buzzing sound’ as I 
listen to it, or my concept ‘that shade of red’ as I try to imagine what the sky 
looked like in the morning, I will call "direct phenomenal concept". The second 
kind, like the concept ‘pain’ as I apply it to your tooth-ache, I’ll call “indirect 
phenomenal concept”. Indirect phenomenal concepts are derivative on direct 
phenomenal concepts.  
The account is then that direct phenomenal concepts are partly constituted 
by the experiences they refer to. If this is so then of course phenomenal concepts 
are direct also in the sense that they don’t have any functional, physical, etc. 
 
20 Loar 1997.  
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analyses. This explains why zombies are conceivable. If there is no analytical 
connection between physical and phenomenal concepts, not even via the 
mediation of, e.g., functional concepts then there won’t be any conceptual 
contradiction in the zombie scenario. In fact, the conceivability of zombies is not 
an embarrassing anomaly for Physicalism on this view, but rather one of the 
expected consequences of a physicalist theory of phenomenal concepts.  
The intimate connection that this theory posits between a phenomenal 
concept and the experience it refers to also explains the incorrigibility of certain 
phenomenal judgments. A token of a direct phenomenal concept will contain a 
token of the experience it refers to and so certain judgments involving the concept 
will be infallible. For example, a phenomenal concept may refer to a particular 
type of visual experience, say the experience typically caused by seeing a red 
object in ordinary light, etc. – call this type of experience reddish – by being 
constituted in part by a particular token of that type of experience. If I form the 
judgment 
‘This experience is reddish’  
where ‘this experience’ refers to and is partly constituted by an experience of 
mine that is also partly constitutive of my concept 'reddish' then the judgment 
cannot fail to be true. 
 The constitutional account helps to explain some other puzzling features 
of conscious states: that our knowledge of our own conscious states (unlike of the 
conscious states of others) is via direct acquaintance with them, and that this 
acquaintance seems to provide us a special insight into the nature of these states. 
Take the case of perception. We know about the presence of a red object by 
perceiving its redness. Our perception of redness mediates our knowledge of the 
presence of the red object, by providing evidence for judging that a red object is 
present. The perception of redness and redness itself are distinct. Judging that an 
object is red is an indirect judgment based on the data provided by perception.  
 Now take the case of the judgments that we form about our own 
phenomenal states, say the judgment that I am undergoing a reddish experience. It 
seems that I am immediately acquainted with this experience and my judgment is 
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not based on anything except the experience itself. This is well accounted for by 
the constitutional account of phenomenal concepts. If phenomenal concepts are 
partly constituted by phenomenal states, our knowledge of the presence of these 
states (at least in our “inner” way of thinking of them) is not mediated by 
something distinct from these states. It is in some sense direct and not mediated 
by any independent evidence – rather the judgment contains its own evidence. 
Also, the insight such judgments afford us into the nature of conscious states is 
insight into what it is like to have such states. This insight is inevitable on the 
constitutional account. You couldn’t form the appropriate judgments unless you 
had the experience. 
 
Phenomenal consciousness: emergent or physical? 
 
The constitutional account of phenomenal concepts seems quite successful 
in explaining the puzzles surrounding phenomenal consciousness in a way that is 
fully compatible with Physicalism. There is nothing incoherent about the notion 
of phenomenal concepts being physical properties of the brain partly constituted 
by phenomenal properties that are themselves physical properties of the brain. 
Furthermore, this account shows why, on the assumption of Physicalism, we 
shouldn’t expect to have a revelatory metaphysics of consciousness. Zombies are 
conceivable, on this account, not because consciousness is non-physical, but 
because phenomenal concepts refer to them directly. For the same reason, 
phenomenal concepts don’t have revealing analyses, and scientific accounts of 
phenomenal properties will always seem puzzling. So far, so good.  
 But the account is also compatible with dualism. Doesn’t this show that 
the account is actually no help for Physicalism? Not in my view, for two reasons. 
First, there are arguments for Physicalism that carry a lot of weight.21 This 
provides a dialectic in which the constitutional account helps dispelling apparent 
problems with a view that has independent plausibility. Second, dualism is quite 
implausible and metaphysically awkward in a number of related ways. 
 
21 Papineau 1995; Loewer 1995. 
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 First, it is in tension with the nomological/causal completeness of physics. 
As we have seen, the nomological/causal completeness of physics is the doctrine 
that all physical change can be accounted for causally and nomologically – to the 
extent it can be accounted for at all – without going outside the physical realm. 
According to this principle, the falling of a tree (which consists of motions of 
particles that compose the tree) at t can be accounted for entirely – to the extent it 
can be accounted for at time t0 – in terms of the state of the universe (or a 
sufficiently large part of that state) at t0 and the fundamental laws of physics. 
Adding other descriptions of events at t0, including mental descriptions –  
whether or not these are necessitated by the physical descriptions – add nothing to 
specifying whether the tree will fall or what the probability is of the tree falling. 
There is good – but not conclusive – reason to think that the causal/nomological 
completeness of physics is true. The fundamental physical laws really do seem to 
cover all physical phenomena including human neurological phenomena and 
bodily behavior. At least there are no cases where it is plausible that anything 
physical violates the fundamental physical laws.22 Even some dualists (e.g., 
Chalmers) seem to accept it.  
 But if it is true then it is difficult to see what the causal role of mental 
properties is in the dualist ontology. There seem to be just two, equally 
implausible possibilities. One is that there are no horizontal laws connecting a 
mental property instantiation to a subsequent physical (or mental) property 
instantiation. This is epiphenomenalism. The other possibility is that there are 
horizontal laws but they are always compatible with the physical laws that 
connect physical states with subsequent physical property instantiations. This 
would involve massive causal overdetermination.  Jaegwon Kim has argued 
forcefully against either of these possibilities.23  The first is problematic since it is 
 
22 For a comprehensive history of the interaction between the development of the 
sciences and views on the causal/nomological completeness principle see 
Papineau 2001. 
23 Although, somewhat ironically, in his recent book Physicalism or Something 
Near Enough Kim seems to end up with a kind of epiphenomenalist dualist view 
since he claims that phenomenal properties are not ontologically reducible to 
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difficult to see how we can know anything about the instantiation of properties 
that have no effects24, but more worrisome, it just seems crazy to think that all our 
mental states have no physical effects. Massive overdetermination also seems 
enormously implausible. Why would God have made all the horizontal laws 
connecting the mental with the physical if in fact they make no difference to what 
happens (and would make no difference in any physically possible world)? 
A second, and related problem is that, on both varieties of dualism, it is 
metaphysically, though probably not nomologically possible for phenomenal 
properties to be completely separated from physical action. Pain, e.g., might 
systematically result in “inappropriate” action, say, instead of avoidance it might 
result in behavior that seeks out pain; or, alternately, there might be no systematic 
connection between phenomenal experiences and action at all. Random and 
inappropriate phenomenal experiences might be paired up with unrelated actions 
and lives. If the mental and the physical are radically distinct then it must be 
possible for them to interact in all manners of ways, including unusual, 
“senseless”, “weird” ways. It is not clear that these “weird” scenarios are even 
coherent. Furthermore, the possible weirdness doesn’t even stop at phenomenal 
experiences getting disconnected from action. According to dualism, there are 
metaphysically possible worlds, e.g., in which phenomenal properties are 
connected by law not with biological organisms but inanimate objects of various 
sizes. So on the dualist view my car might be conscious or Mount Everest might. 
 
 
Third, Emergent Property Dualism has to account for why psycho-
physical correlations occur even though phenomenal properties are not 
metaphysically determined by the physical; to explain those correlations 
nomological relations are posited. But the kind of laws, both vertical and 
 
physical properties and that physics is causally complete. Given that he has so 
strongly opposed causal overdetermination it appears that he considers 
phenomenal properties epiphenomenal.  
24 One might argue that a person is acquainted with her phenomenal states and 
that this relation is not a causal one. But this seems to just put a label on the 
mystery. 
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horizontal, that Emergent Property Dualism posits are found no where else in 
nature. The relationship between configurations of physical entities and properties 
and, for example, geological and biological phenomena are not like vertical laws 
at all. Certain configurations of physical entities and properties literally constitute 
or realize geological and biological phenomena. There is no need for an “extra” 
law to connect the two. This doesn’t mean that biological properties are identical 
to physical properties. The reason is that certain biological properties are multiply 
realizable, not only by various physical configurations, but by configurations of 
ontologies that are different from the actual physical ontology and that satisfy 
laws that are different from the actual laws of physics. Underlying this is the 
widely accepted view that biological properties are individuated in terms of their 
causal/nomological relations. A possible entity that looks, walks, etc. like a duck 
may not be a duck (if it lacks the DNA of a duck) but it is plausibly alive in virtue 
of instantiating the causal/nomological profile that individuates living creatures. 
Dualism, on the other hand, posits genuine laws connecting physical and 
phenomenal property instantiations. There are two ways the dualist can think of 
these laws. Depending on whether a dualist thinks of conscious properties as 
primitive, or as being realized by complexes of proto-conscious properties, 
different, but equally damaging difficulties arise. If the dualist holds that 
conscious properties are primitive then she will have to posit laws that connect 
enormously complex physical properties with simple phenomenal properties, like 
the sensation of a particular shade of red. She will have to posit not just a few, but 
a whole multitude of such fundamental laws, corresponding to each primitive 
conscious property. These laws are different from any laws of nature we know 
from science. This doesn’t show that the theory is false, only that it is implausible. 
She might think, on the other hand, that conscious properties are not primitive but 
are realized by complexes of proto-conscious properties. In this case the laws 
would connect complex properties with complex properties; so no implausibility 
on this count.  However, in this case the dualist owes us an account of how 
exactly proto-conscious properties combine to produce the familiar conscious 
properties. The nature of these complex properties is entirely obscure and it 
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doesn’t seem likely that there is a realization theory in the offing to clear up the 
mystery. The situation, mutatis mutandis, is very similar concerning the 
horizontal, diachronical laws interactionist dualists posit to connect mental and 
physical property instantiations at different times.  
Fourth, although modern day dualists focus their attention solely on the 
possibility of worlds exactly like ours physically, but lacking any phenomenal 
properties instantiated, and not on the converse, that is, the possibility of worlds 
exactly like ours phenomenally, but lacking in any physical properties 
instantiated, it appears that a dualist would have to condone the existence of 
purely phenomenal worlds.25 It is barely intelligible what a world like that would 
be like.  
A final note. The constitutional account, as I said, is compatible with 
dualism. As a matter of fact, there is a dualist version of it proposed by David 
Chalmers26. However, there are serious problems that a dualist version of the 
constitutional account faces. Chalmers summarizes the view like this: “In 
particular, I will take it that… the content of a phenomenal concept and a 
corresponding phenomenal belief, is partly constituted by an underlying 
phenomenal quality, in that the content will mirror the quality (picking out 
instances of the quality in all epistemic possibilities.” (p. 14) Several questions 
arise. What is the constitution relation in the dualist framework and how does that 
relation succeed in determining reference? Chalmers treats constitution as in no 
need of explanation except in so far as whatever it is a phenomenal concept 
succeeds in picking out in every (conceptually) possible world is the experience 
type the constituent experience is a token of. But any token experience falls under 
several experience types: e.g., experience of red, experience of dark red, of red 
218, etc. What determines which experience type a given phenomenal concept 
refers to? It is also difficult to understand how something non-physical can be 
partly constitutive of something else – the phenomenal concept – that, 
 
25Descartes actually did in the Meditations (cf. Cottingham, et. al 1984). 
26 Chalmers 2003. 
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presumably, will be involved in causal transactions via the judgments that contain 
them.  
 So, while the constitutional account is compatible with dualism, dualism is 
quite unattractive on its own, and the chief reasons people end up embracing 
dualism in the first place are the very ones the constitutional account helps 
disarming. All this points to the conclusion that the radical ontological novelty of 
conscious phenomena is an illusion. What is novel in the evolution of minds is 
our first person phenomenal concepts, but the novelty here is not ontological. 
There are no novel properties and laws involved in our mental lives – the familiar 
physical entities, properties, and laws will do. With the constitutional account we 
have an explanation of why, even though conscious phenomena are physical, we 
have an almost irresistible tendency to treat them as ontologically novel relative to 
the physical. But with the constitutional account we also have a reason to resist 
this tendency.  
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